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BANKRUPTCY
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "FARMER"
The debtor owned a farm of about 190 acres on which he had lived
all his life, but for some time previous to 193o he had been engaged in
mercantile pursuits. Because of financial losses he began working on the
farm again, to which he devoted most of his time. He was principally
occupied in raising poultry, although he had a small orchard and garden.
During the years from 1930 to 1935 his total income was $4,000.00 of
which $2,200.00 was derived from renting three-fourths of the farm
to tenants for grazing and cultivation, $300.00 from the sale of farm
products, and the balance of $1,500.00 from other real estate not
claimed to be farm property. The district court held that the debtor was
not a farmer within the meaning of section 75r of the bankruptcy act'
and dismissed his petition for composition and extension of his debts.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this de-
cision upon the ground that the debtor's principal income was from
farming operations," which result was affirmed by the Supreme Court.3
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in delivering the opinion of the court, said that,
when the facts are viewed as a whole, the debtor was "personally" and
"primarily" engaged in farming operations.
It is impossible to arrive at a concrete definition of a farmer. How-
ever, certain general principles may be formulated from the decided
cases. The bankruptcy act defines a farmer as "an individual who is
primarily bona fide personally engaged in producing products of the
soil * " *, or the principal part of whose income is derived from any
one or more of the foregoing operations * * *" enumerated in the sec-
tion.' The phrases of the definition do not constitute terms of art, but
Bankruptcy Act, sc. 75r, 49 Stat. 246, i1 U.S.C.A. sec. zo3r (93).
s In re Beachs, 86 Fed. (zd) 88 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1936).
a First National Bank e Trust Co. v. Beach, 301 U.S . 435, 57 S. Ct. Sox, Si L. Ed.
i no6 (1937).
'Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 75r, 49 Stat. 246, 1s U.S.C.A. 203r (935). The operations
enumerated are "primarily bona fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil,"
["primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy farming, the production of poultry or
liveltock, or the production of poultry products or livestock products in their unmanufac-
tured state."] The part set off in brackets was not included in the section a passed in
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rather each individual case must be considered upon its own peculiar
facts.' In addition, some courts have said the term "farmer" depends
upon its meaning in the particular locality.6 But this would seem to be
nothing more than one of the facts to be considered in each case.
An individual to be classed as a "farmer" must operate a substantial
tract of land. What constitutes a substantial tract has not been definitely
decided; but where the debtor was engaged in truck-gardening on a plot
of ground the size of six city blocks,7 or, as in another case, four and one-
half acres,8 he was held not to have been a farmer, while twenty acres,
in another case was sufficient.9 The objection does not seem to be di-
rected to truck-gardening, as such, and if the debtor operates on a large
enough scale, he should be declared a farmer. In numerous instances the
truck-farmer, in addition to raising his garden, markets the produce, yet
he does not necessarily become a huckster.'"
Under the present amendment, the words "primarily-personally
engaged" are similar to the former expression "chiefly engaged.""
Thus, now as then, a person need only be chiefly engaged in farming to
be classified as a farmer, which is determined by considering the amount
of time, revenue, and indebtedness derived or involved in each of his
business activities.' The debtor need not perform manual farm labor,
and he will retain his character as a farmer, although he has moved
1933, Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75r, 47 Stat. 1470, 11 U.S.C.A. sec. 2o3r. Previous to this
amendment, under section 4b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 547, 11 U.S.C.A.
sec. zzb, the courts were divided as to whether persons engaged in these phases of "farm-
ing" were exempt. This depended upon the construction by the courts whether or not the
branches of the definition, "chiefly engaged in farming" and "tillage of the soil" were
synonymous. Those courts, which held that they were synonymous, said that such persons
were not exempt. In re Stubbs, 281 Fed. 568 (D.C. Wyo. 19Z2)5 In re Palma Bros.,
8 Fed. Supp. 920 (D.C. Nev. 2934); unless such occupation was merely incidental to the
tillage of the soil. Gregg v. Mitchell, 166 Fed. 7z2, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 248, 16 Ann. Cas.
5io (C.C.A. 6th, i9o9). Under the other construction livestock raising had been held to
be farming. Robertson v. Dwyer, 284 Fed. 88o (C.C.A. 7th, r911). A case decided pre-
vious to the 1935 amendment held that a person deriving all of his income from raising
poultry was engaged primarily in farming operations. In re Wilkinson, 2o Fed. Supp. oo
(D.C. N.Y. 1935). For a general discussion of the topic see: 25 Ore. L. Rev. 6z (2935);
2o Minn. L. Rev. 307 (935); z O.S.L.J. 282 (2936).
'First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Beachj supra, note 3; In re Knight, 9 Fed.
Supp. 5oz (D.C. Conn. 1935); In re Storey, 9 Fed. Supp. 858 (D.C. Cal. 2935).
'In re McMurray, 8 Fed. Supp. 449 (D.C. Iowa 1934); In re Palma Bros., 8 Fed.
Supp. 920 (D.C. Nev. 2934).
In re McMurray, 8 Fed. Supp. 449 (D.C. Iowa 1934).
s In re Weis, so Fed. Supp. 227 (D.C. Iowa 1935).
5
In re Wilkinson, so Fed. Supp. ioo (D.C. N.Y. 2935).
"
5 In re Terry, zoS Fed. 262 (D.C. Pa. 1923) which says that "because a man who
produces food products by cultivtating the soil markets these products by carting the same
from door to door, or by selling to merchants at wholesale or at retail upon his own
premises, he cannot be said to be a huckster and not a tiller of the soil."
"In re Day, io Fed. Supp. 229 (D.C. 11. 2935); 2 O.$.L.J. 282 (2936).
" In re Browin, 253 Fed. (C.C. A. 9th, 298) ; In re Mackey, izo Fed. 355 (D.C.
Del. i9oi).
away if he retains an active interest in the management of the farm, 3
which may be exercised through an agent.'4 However, supervision has
been held to be only an incident to looking after an investment where
the debtor was considered as primarily engaged as a civil engineer;"
or as property management, where a lawyer's potential income was
greater from other sources, although he had given up his practice and
moved to the farm.'" But a person will remain a farmer, if his other
activities are incidental to that of farming.'
7
The phrase, "the principal part of whose income is derived from
farming operations," appears at first glance to be a provision that would
include those persons who are primarily engaged in another occupation,
or none at all, as retired farmers, who prior to the amendment of 1933,
were held not to be exempt from involuntary bankruptcy.' 8 But the
courts interpreting the present section have not been uniform in their
construction of the two parts of the definition. The case of In re Day'9
held that there is little or no distinction between the phrases, "engaged
chiefly in farming," "personally engaged primarily in farming," and "the
principal part of whose income is derived from farming operations."
Another interpretation is that the party must be engaged "primarily" in
farming operations, and the clause, "or the principal part of whose
income," etc., was a precaution against bad years when he is forced to
earn a livelihood from some other occupation.2" In re Olsen2' concludes
that the principal part of the debtor's income must be derived "from
bona fide personal engagement in producing products of the soil." Thus,
it seems that these courts have failed to give effect to the wording of the
definition, and the debtor must be engaged primarily in farming as before
13In re Glick, 26 Fed. (zd) 398 (C.C.A. 7th, 29z8).
" In re Vrhgh's Estate, 17 Fed. Supp. 908 (D.C. La. 1936). The farm properties
were superintended by the debtor through her son. Since she furnished tools and equipment
and financed the operations, her status was not affected by the fact that the farms were, in
part, cultivated by tenants, some of whom worked on quarter and half shares.
U In re Day, Io Fed. Supp. zz9 (D.C. Ill. 1935).
1" Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, N. Y., 92 Fed. (zd) 404 (C.C.A. Sth, 1937);
Cf. In re Olson, z Fed. Supp. 504 (D.C. Iowa 1937).
'7 In re Parmer, 16 Fed. Supp. ioo6 (D.C. Pa. 2936) (engaged in stone crushing
and threshing); Couts v. Townsend, 126 Fed. 249 (D.C. Ky. 1903) (private banking),
Anerican Agriculture Chemical Co. v. Brinkley, 194 Fed. 411 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1912) (store-
keeper)5 In re Hoy, 137 Fed. 175 (D.C. La. 29o5) (lawyer).
" "Any natural person except * * * a person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage
of the soil *** may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
sec. 4 b, 30 Stat. S47, ii U.S.C.A. zzb. This section, at present, reads: "Any natural per-
son except * * ' a farmer, * * * may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt ** *. Bank-
ruptcy Act, sec. 4b, 49 Stat. 246, it U.S.C.A. sec. 22b (193S). Glass v. Farmer's Loan &
Trust Co., 53 Fed. (zd) 844 (C.C.A. 7th, 1932); In re Driver, z52 Fed. 956 (D.C. N.J.
191Sx 1o Fed. Supp. z29 (D.C. Ill. 1935).
In re Hilliker, 9 Fed. Supp. 948 (D.C. Cal. 1935); see Sherwood v. Kitcher, 86
Fed. (2d) 750, 751 (C.C.A. znd, 1936).
Ill z Fed. Supp. 504 (D.C. Iowa, 1937)-
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the amendment. Hence, in those instances of cases involving retired
farmers, etc., the change of the section does not apparently vary the
result of the former decisions. On the other hand, a few courts have
recognized the possibility of a person being classed as a farmer under the
second part of the definition. In re Shonkuiler'2 held that the debtor,
who had derived all of her income from a farm where she did not
operate or manage the farm, but lived in another state with her husband,
was a farmer. Another court said: "The debtor made a prima facie
showing [that she was a farmer] by alleging in her petition that the
principal part of her income was derived from farming operations."23
The principal case and Louisuille Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford2 4
recognized, in dictum, that situations may arise where income from
farming operations would make one a farmer who was otherwise occu-
pied, as this must have been the intent of Congress.
In the principal case, the largest part of the debtor's income was
derived from renting three-fourths of the farm to tenants and from other
sources not farming. No other case is in point upon these facts, but
where a large part of a farm was operated by tenants, more properly
termed sharecroppers, the status of the debtor as a farmer was not
thereby affected.25 Whether or not these facts affect the debtor's classi-
fication after he is considered as primarily engaged in farming is best
answered by quoting from Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion: "If Beach
was a farmer because he cultivated a substantial farm, he did not step into
another business by leasing other acres of the tract to tenants for farm-
ing, grazing, or cultivation. Those acres personally cultivated and those
occupied by tenants are phases and aspects of a unitary calling. The
result will be the same, though the farming and leasing be viewed as
disconnected, and not as parts of a composite whole. In that view the
farming is still the business, the leases are the investments, more profitable
than the business, but leaving it unchanged. A farmer remains a farmer,
just as a lawyer remains a lawyer though the returns of his investment,
while not enough to keep him going, are larger, none the less, than the
profits of his labor."2 Under such circumstances, a lawyer would seem
to be classifiable as a farmer within the second branch of the definition,
if it is read in the disjunctive. But to carry out the purpose of section 75,
rehabilitation of distressed farmers as such, 7 the requirement, by some
22 17 Fed. Supp. 697 (D.C. IlL. 1935); cf. Rudy v. Fed. Land Bank of Baltimore,
91 Fed. (2d) 549 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1937).
"In re Storey, 9 Fed. Supp. 858 (D.C. Cal. 1935).
2. 295 U. S. 555, 599, 55 S. Ct. 854, 867, 79 L. Ed. 1593, 16io (1935).
25In re Wright's Estate, 17 Fed. Supp. 908 (D.C. La. z936), cited supra note 14.
26 First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435, 439, 57 S. Ct. 8o, 803,
81 L. Ed. xzo6, 1209 (x937)-
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of the courts that the debtor be primarily engaged in farming, would be
more within the spirit of the statute.
In view of the present legislation before Congress it is appropriate
to discuss how this may affect the present definition as construed by the
courts. Section I (7) provides that: " 'Farmer' shall mean an indi-
vidual personally engaged in farming or tillage of the soil, and shall
include an individual personally engaged in dairy farming or the pro-
duction of poultry, livestock, or poultry or livestock products in their
unmanufactured state, if the principal part of his income is derived from
any one of such operations." 2 This is another attempt by the drafters
to clarify the definition,2" but contrary to the usual procedure, it seems
to be in accord with the interpretation of the majority of the courts.
Thus, if farming and renting is to be viewed as a "unitary calling," it
would seem that, as a logical conclusion, the decision in the principal
case would be the same under this definition. Although the proposed
change would clearly exclude the retired farmer from its scope, the
question still remains whether, if a doctor, or lawyer, or other person
were personally engaged in farming, by management or otherwise, and
the principal part of his income were derived from this source, he would
be exempt even though he is primarily engaged in his other occupation.
Or, would a debtor, primarily engaged in farming, but obtaining the
principal part of his income from other activities, be held not to be a
farmer? Both of these are possible interpretations of the section. The
purpose of the section appears then, to be not a desire to effect a rehabili-
tation of farmers, as such, but to relieve the poor farmer from the burden
of his obligations which would seem to be always present.
ITHAMAR D. WEED
2In re Noble, 29 Fed. Supp. 5o4 (D.C. N.J., 1937).
H.R. 8046, p. 2.
. Chandler, Report No. 1409, p. 6.
